



2024 British Society for the Theory of Knowledge *Biennial Conference*

James McCune Smith Building, University of Glasgow
Registration: <https://bstk.org.uk/membership.html>

11 September 2024 - Plenary Talks (JMS 639)

09:00 – 09:30 Coffee

09:30 – 09:45 Welcome: Jessica Brown (President) and Chris Kelp (Director)

09:45 – 10:45 Richard Pettigrew (Bristol): ‘On Uncertainty: A Bayesian Commentary on *On Certainty*’

10:45 – 11:00 Break

11:00 – 12:00 Alison Hills (Oxford): TBA

12:00 – 13: 30 Lunch Break

13: 39 – 14: 30 Alexander Bird (Cambridge): TBA

14: 30 – 14: 45 Break

14: 45 – 15:45 Mona Simion (Glasgow): TBA

15: 45 – 16: 00 Break

16:00 – 17: 00 Presidential Address: Jessica Brown (St Andrews): TBA

12 September 2024 - Parallel Sessions (JMS 639, JMS 630, & 629)

Morning Session

Time	JMS, Room 639	JMS, Room 630	JMS, Room 629
09:30 - 10:00	Robin McKenna (Liverpool): Doing Your Own (Patient Activist) Research	Filippo Riscica (Bologna): Group Beliefs: A New Account and Challenges to the Group Agent Account.	Joel Yalland (Kent): Agreement and Disagreement with Epistemic Non-Peers
10:00 - 10:30	Dario Mortini (Barcelona): One Less for the Knowledge Norm of Assertion.	Ethan Lai (St Andrews): A Fragmentationist Approach to the Preface Paradox	Amber Riaz (LUMS): Reflective Incoherence

Time	JMS, Room 639	JMS, Room 630	JMS, Room 629
10:30 - 11:00	Javier González de Prado Salas: (UNED): Higher-order uncertainty at the end of inquiry	Lou Thomine (Cologne): Why testimonial injustice is not epistemically distinct	Guido Tana (IUSS Pavia): Recognizing Others in Arguments: Epistemic Injustice and the Adversarial Stance
11:00 - 11:30	<i>Coffee Break</i>	<i>Coffee Break</i>	<i>Coffee Break</i>
11:30 - 12:00	Matt Vermaire (Erlangen-Nürnberg): Inquiry with an Attitude	Jack Herbert (Sheffield): The Reliability of Filtering in Testimony: The Evidential Hypothesis	André Abath (Federal University of Minas Gerais): Ignorance of what things are: Who's to blame?
12:00 - 12:30	Joe Slater (Glasgow): Clued-Up Consequentialists	Lukas Schwengerer (Duisburg-Essen): Tool-Assisted Self-Knowledge.	Gabriel Malagutti (Lisbon): What kind of knowledge can we acquire from Conversational AIs?
12:30 - 13:00	Matt Jope (Edinburgh): Trust, Risk, and Mere Vulnerability.	Katharina Bernhard (St. Andrews): Towards an Epistemology of Inductive Risk	Rory Aird (Glasgow): (Un)politicised claims and the proper object of partisan deference.

13:00 - 14:30 *Lunch Break*

Afternoon Session

Time	JMS, Room 639	JMS, Room 630	JMS, Room 629
14:30 - 15:00	Giacomo Giannini, Lewis Ross & Nastasia Müller (HHU Düsseldorf and LSE): Why we cannot trust a philosopher (about philosophy)	Ben Clarke (Edinburgh): Trust, Belief, and Evidence-Gathering	Sam Kang (KCL) Testimonial Reliance and Holistic Reliabilism

Time	JMS, Room 639	JMS, Room 630	JMS, Room 629
15:00 - 15:30	Ross Patrizio (Glasgow): Outsourcing Inquiry	Jaakko Hirvelä (Helsinki): Epistemic Decision Theory and Doxastic Duties	Katarzyna Ciarcińska & Olga Tunkiewicz (Szczecin): Overcoming Epistemic Injustice in Understanding of Autism
15:30 - 16:00	Claire Field & Kurt Sylvan, (Zurich and Southampton): Reasonable Adjustments in Attentional Normativity	Kegan Shaw (Anderson University): A Relevant Alternatives Account of Disagreement.	Ravi Thakral (University of Nevada, Reno): The role of default cognition in foundational epistemology
16:00 - 16:30	<i>Coffee Break</i>	<i>Coffee Break</i>	<i>Coffee Break</i>
16:30 - 17:00	Giada Fratantonio (Glasgow): Inferential knowledge first?	João C. Miranda (Lisbon): Why Contrastivists about Knowledge should be Topic- Sensitivists about Belief	Dani Pino (Seville): Upstream and Downstream Abilities in Understanding-Why

Day Three: 13 September 2024 - Plenary Talks (JMS 639)

09:00 – 10:00 Martin Smith (Edinburgh): Moral Encroachment and Group-to-Individual Inferences

10:00 – 10:10 Break

10:10 – 11:10 Paul Faulkner (Sheffield): Disharmony and Injustice

11:10 – 11:20 Break

11:20 – 12:20 Peter J. Graham (UC Riverside): TBA

12:20 – 13:40 Lunch Break

13: 40 – 14:40 Daniel Whiting (Southampton): The End of Reason, is Truth: Margaret Cavendish on Teleology and Rationality

14:40 – 14:50 Break

14:50 – 15:50 Clayton Littlejohn (ACU): What Is Sufficient Evidence?

15: 50 – 16:00 Break

16:00 – 17:00 Lizzie Fricker (Oxford): Understanding at Second-Hand Is Possible